Meaning what you say
ozarque is worried about a thing she calls "literalism" in this post. (I say "a thing she calls 'literalism'" because, as I hope will become clear, I'm not sure that "literalism" really means anything in the first place.)

One of the problems as she points out is this one:

My concern is the cognitive gymnastics required when a person must somehow believe, all at the same time, a set of propositions like this one: (a) Jesus is my Lord, and I am required to do what he said to do; (b) the Bible says that adultery is a grievous sin for which the proper penalty is death; (c) Jesus said that any man who divorces a woman for a reason other than adultery and then marries another woman is an adulterer; (d) I am a God-fearing Christian man who has divorced one woman and married another.

Now of course that doesn't, all by itself, require any mental gymnastics. One could simply add "(e) I do not do what my Lord requires me to do." What's wrong with that? Well, on one hand, it's wrong to do what one should not do. But another sense to the question "what's wrong with that?" would suggest that there is nothing logically wrong: no words are being tortured, no mental gymnastics. Indeed, isn't this what we all do (whether religious or not)? Nearly everyone is confronted with the combination of (i) I should not do X and (ii) I do X. No mental gymnastics are necessary to understand.

So what is the problem actually? There are really two candidates, and I suspect that ozarque is really bothered about both, though I'm not sure she has carefully separated the two. (And part of the reason I think she hasn't is her use of the word "literalism," in fact.)

So the first candidate: we have people who say (i) I should not do X, (ii) I do X, (iii) it is in some sense OK that I do X, (iv) you should not do Y, (v) you do Y, (vi) it is not in any sense OK that you do Y. Now to make this something like a contradiction, we need principles of universalizability, such as "what ever makes it OK that I do X must rest upon grounds that can be applied neutrally to any person and to other wrong acts besides just X." There is much discussion in the philosophical literature about just what universalizability criteria are the right ones to assume, but this debate does not concern us here. If this (i) to (vi) bothers you (as I think it should), then let that be the pointer to whatever the right kind of universalizability is, and let's not fret about that detail.

This first candidate for what ozarque is worried about is a kind of making special exceptions for oneself, a refusal to see that (iii) and (vi) are in deep tension. An example of this came up not to long ago, in which a prominent conservative Episcopalian--divorced and remarried--was asked about his divorce, and he replied that his divorce and remarriage took place before he "found Jesus." But the same person would not allow that if two men met and married, and then "found Jesus" it would be OK for them to continue their relationship. So the full dynamic is in play; justifying (iii) is an attempted universal rule ("sins you commit before you find Jesus don't count," which deep theological roots), the misapplication of that rule to (ii), since the issue is not the past divorce but the present sex with the second wife, and the refusal to apply the rule similarly to (vi). If this is what ozarque is worried about, it's worth being worried about.

But I note that there is nothing particularly religious about this problem. Religion is entering in only as a bolster for (i) and (iv), and it isn't (i) and (iv) that are the problem. Religion is also offering a support for a universal rule that sanctions (iii), but here again, the problem isn't the rule being applied, but its misapplication--indeed, the real problem is that the rule is being applied to generate (iii) and not to generate (vi), which is a problem that is independent of where the rule comes from.

Ok, so while this is a problem, I guess that it is not what ozarque is most bothered by, because then there would be no reason for describing it as being a problem about religious language. It would be a problem in moral psychology, and have nothing to do with any particularly religious question or language.

So I give a second guess. Perhaps what ozarque is most bothered by is this different phenomenon. There are people who say something like: (I) Everything the Bible says is literally true; (II) Jesus said that remarriage after divorce was a great sin, (III) I am remarried after divorce, and (IV) I do not believe that I am committing a great sin. Note that here we do not need to add a reference to other people. The first guess above was about someone cutting exceptions for themselves which they would not cut for others. The second does not inherently involve that--though, of course, it might, when someone goes on to say "your homosexuality is a great sin because the bible says so and you should be treated as a great sinner therefore." So in this second guess at ozarque's worry, the worry is purely about the speaker's own state, and not about an unfairness or misapplication of rules or universalizations.

When confronted with this second sort of person, also one that I agree is problematic and worrisome, I find that the answer is so obvious that I'm flabbergasted that ozarque would think it's a serious problem worth investigation. The person in question simply does not actually believe "remarriage after divorce is a great sin." Either their reasoning is broken (which is sometimes but not often the case), or else they simply don't believe either (I) or (II). They proceed to talk as if (II) is the one they don't believe (by qualifying their exegesis with implausible wiggles, which they tend then to be unwilling to use to qualify the commands that bite other people--indeed, this might explain ozarque's conflating of these two kinds of problems!). But in fact, it isn't (II) that they don't believe, it's (I).

Part of the problem is this word "literally," which is one that I have never been able to determine what it means. Presumably it means "not figuratively," in which case I would defend (elsewhere, not here) that this dichotomy is a matter of more and less, and all language is always (at least a little bit) figurative. But here it suffices to say that the people in question simply do not believe that everything in the Bible is true even when interpreted as being non figurative. (Does God have hands?)

So they say (I), but don't really believe it. Sometimes they believe the more plausible "everything the Bible says is true." But that can't raise the hackles that ozarque says she's worried about, because it leaves room for interpretive strategies that allow one to deny (II) without the wiggles being crazy--since one has not signed on to a "literalist" program of exegesis, there is no craziness in using "non-literal" ways of understanding (II), which don't generate the problematic contradiction.

Once we're done, what we really have I think is the question: "Why do people assert things like (I) when they don't believe them?" But that's not even about language at all.

So I'm stuck: there are three ways to understand the worry that ozarque points to: the one she explains, which can't be right because it isn't a contradiction in the first place--it's just an ordinary human experience of failing to meet one's own standards--and the other two which I think she is worried about, but one of them isn't about religious language after all, and the other isn't about language--religious or otherwise.